Epidemiologic analysis of racial/ethnic disparities: Some fundamental issues and a cautionary example by Kaufman, Jay S.
Details for Manuscript Number SSM-D-06-02193R1
“Epidemiologic Analysis of Racial/Ethnic Disparities: Some
Fundamental Issues and A Cautionary Example”
Jay S Kaufman
UNC School of Public Health Chapel Hill, NC UNITED STATES
Abstract
Racial/ethnic health disparities are a primary focus of epidemiologic research, encompassing both
sociological hypotheses about differential treatment as well as biomedical hypotheses about
distinctive etiologic processes that might underlie observed disparities. These two main currents in
disparities research are often pitted against one another as opposing paradigms. Despite contentious
debate about the balance between these hypotheses in the etiology of existing disparities, one
consideration that has been largely ignored is that there are important distinctions in the statistical
justifications for these two types of inferences. In this article I review the foundations of causal
inference in etiologic epidemiology as applied to studies of racial/ethnic health disparities. I describe
normative applications of quantitative techniques for causal inference as they are practiced in research
on discrimination in health care and also for research on innate predisposition. I then show why the
latter is an injudicious application of this statistical methodology, and illustrate this point with the
example of an influential study in the biomedical literature that purported to demonstrate a lesser
response to angiotensin-converting-enzyme inhibitor therapy in black as compared with white
patients with left ventricular dysfunction.
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Introduction
Racial/ethnic health disparities are a primary focus of epidemiologic research (Kaufman &
Cooper 2001). This research encompasses both sociological hypotheses, for example about
differential treatment (Smedley et al 2003), as well as biomedical hypothesis about distinctive
etiologic processes that might underlie observed disparities, such as genetic predispositions
(Cooper 2004). These two main currents in disparities research are often pitted against one
another as opposing paradigms, and they have indisputable political implications that affect
the way research is conducted, interpreted and debated. For example, some political
conservatives have decried research emphasis on differential treatment, arguing that it detracts
attention from the individual health behaviors and innate predispositions that contribute
importantly to observed disparities (Satel 2001, Satel and Klick 2005). In contrast, other
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researchers have argued that the observed social disparities in health are a necessary
consequence of political and economic policies and ideologies at the societal level (Navarro
2001, Levins 2000), and have asserted that excessive attention to individual factors such as
genetics and behaviors is a distraction motivated by ideological rather than scientific
justifications (Goodman 2000).
Despite the voluminous and contentious debate on this question of the balance between
individual and social factors in the etiology of racial/ethnic health disparities, one important
consideration that has been largely ignored is that the statistical justification for these two types
of inferences is fundamentally distinct. Although data is collected, analyzed and interpreted in
relation to both of these general hypotheses, the basis for statistical inference and causal
attribution differs in significant ways. This difference can be most readily demonstrated by
noting that the hypothesis of social discrimination is one in which the causal process under
study is in the mind of the physician (or other decision-maker), in response to some acute
stimulus, such as the presentation of a patient whose race is observed. The hypothesis of
individual predilection or predisposition, on the other hand, places the causal process within
the physiology or psychology of the affected individual. In this case, the individual experiences
a behavior or physiologic state because of who they are, a condition that is chronic and
fundamentally inalterable.
There are numerous ramifications of this conceptual distinction between the two causal
hypotheses, but one notable example is that it is possible to design experimental trials to study
discrimination directly, whereas it is not possible to design an experimental study that directly
assesses innate predilection or predisposition. Scientists can certainly learn about mechanisms
at the level of individual physiology and how these contribute to population-level health
disparities, but the process is necessarily inductive. For example, an understanding of the role
of hemoglobin S in the etiology of malaria helps to explain population-level disparities in the
incidence of sickle-cell anemia between people of West African ancestry in contrast to people
of Northern European ancestry. This knowledge did not (and could not) arise from statistical
inference in population studies of risk factors and disease, however, but rather from
physiological studies and inferences from evolutionary theory (Fix 2003).
In this article I review the foundations of causal inference in etiologic epidemiology as it is
applied to studies of racial/ethnic health disparities. I will describe normative applications of
quantitative techniques for causal inference as they are practiced in research on discrimination
in health care and also for research on innate predisposition. I will then show why the latter is
an injudicious application of this statistical methodology, and I will illustrate this point with
the example of an influential study in the biomedical literature that purported to demonstrate
a lesser response to angiotensin-converting-enzyme inhibitor therapy in black as compared
with white patients with left ventricular dysfunction (Exner et al. 2001).
What Epidemiologists Do
Causal inference is fundamentally related to experimentation, which is why the randomized
controlled trial (RCT) is widely considered to be the “gold standard” for establishment of
causality in biomedicine. In an experimental design such as an RCT, the treatment of interest
is assigned or withheld without regard to any measured or unmeasured characteristic of the
individual. Therefore, the cumulative experiences of the two groups at the end of the study
cannot logically result from any systematic differences in covariate distributions (Rubin
1974). It is the absence of the alternative explanation of an unmeasured common cause that
makes a properly conducted RCT such a compelling argument for a causal effect of treatment
expressed in counterfactual terms. That is, the treated and untreated groups can each serve as
valid substitute populations for the other’s unobserved (counterfactual) experiences, and an
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effect measure formed by the contrast between the groups is an unbiased estimate of the true
unobservable causal contrast between treated and untreated summary values for the target
population of interest (Maldonado and Greenland 2002).
In observational studies, in contrast with RCTs, there may exist any number of measured or
unmeasured quantities (Z) that are associated with (but not affected by) a point-exposure of
interest (X) and causally precede the outcome (Y). In general, such variables will act to
confound the observed relation, meaning that the observed association in the data would not
converge to the true causal effect as the sample size becomes infinite (Greenland et al. 1999).
The true causal effect is the one that would be achieved from an experimental manipulation of
X. Formally, if actually forcing X to some specific value x1 would result in a different
probability distribution of Y than if we had forced X to some alternate value x2, we say that X
has a causal effect on Y, and furthermore that the magnitude of this causal effect can be
described as some contrast of these values, such as a difference or a ratio. Pearl developed
succinct notation that expresses such an effect without specifying the form of contrast or the
levels to which X is fixed (Pearl 2000):
(eq. 1)
This notation then allows us to express confounding as the divergence between any such
contrast in experimentally manipulated data and the same contrast in passively observed data:
(eq. 2)
If confounding can be attributed entirely to covariate(s) Z, then adjustment, for example via
standardization, allows for the unbiased estimation of the true causal effect:
(eq. 3)
where summation is over observed values Z=z, and Z is unaffected by X (Rosenbaum 1984).
This is the basic theoretical foundation of statistical adjustment for observational data, and
motivates the approach to all etiologic (as opposed to purely descriptive) analyses. The appeal
to experimental manipulation for a definition of confounding is essential in order to tie the
results back to the real world in some way. That is, the observed data are already a description
of the world as it exists factually. Statistical adjustment creates a new set of numbers which
do not pertain to the factual world, and therefore one must ask: to what world do they pertain?
The answer is that they describe distributions of outcome Y under hypothetical manipulations
of the exposure, letting all other quantities run their natural course (Greenland 2005).
The Experimental Model Applied to Disparities Arising from Discrimination
Applying the analytic epidemiologic model described above to health disparities arising from
differential treatment is straightforward because the experimental intervention is well-defined.
Consider a patient’s socially recognized racial identity in relation to some medical diagnosis,
evaluation or procedure, such as referral for right-heart catheterization (Schulman et al.
1999). What we want to know is whether the causal process to refer or not refer, which takes
place in the physician’s mind, is affected (consciously or unconsciously) by the patient’s race.
In the conduct of an experiment, we can hold all other factors constant. That is, we can present
a decision-maker with two patients who are identical in all relevant respects except for the one
characteristic of interest. If the physician’s decision is consistently associated with patient’s
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race over a large number of such matched pairs in this experimental design, then the only
plausible interpretation is that the decision-maker is using race in order to decide how to act.
If there is no good evidence base for considering race in this way, then the decision-making
process is discriminatory in the pejorative sense of the word.
A large number of experimental trials with this basic design have been conducted over the
years in order to document the role that patient demographics play in clinical decision-making.
For example, Loring and Powell (1988) constructed two psychiatric case presentations that
were intended to represent undifferentiated schizophrenia, and these were randomly assigned
to be from one of five categories, consisting of each of four race/sex combinations (black/white
and male/female) and a fifth group lacking any demographic information. These profiles were
then assigned a diagnosis by 290 psychiatrists who returned questionnaires through the mail.
Even though the case vignettes were identical except for the demographic information, the
proportions of various diagnoses varied substantially by randomly assigned sex and race of the
hypothetical patients. For example, black patients, especially black men, were much more
likely to be assigned the diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, indicating that clinicians
perceived in these descriptions greater degrees of violence, suspiciousness and dangerousness
than for the identical white patients. Furthermore, of 19 respondents who said that insufficient
information was available to form a judgment, 12 had vignettes for which race and gender had
not been provided.
Many other experimental trials of this basic design have been conducted over the years to
demonstrate the causal role of race in decision-making in a variety of settings, usually in
situations in which there is general agreement that conditioning the decision on race has no
rational justification. For example, Bertrand and Mullainathan sent fictitious resumes to help-
wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers, randomly assigning African-American- or
White-sounding names to the otherwise identical applications. In this study, white names
received fifty percent more callbacks for interviews. What these experimental studies have in
common is the assurance that there are no variables, measured or unmeasured, that are
correlated with the exposure (race) and independently predictive of the outcome. The patients
or job applicants can have no such characteristics because, in fact, they don’t exist. They are
represented only by a written case presentation or job application that is known to be invariant.
Any perceived differences in the outcome distribution, therefore, are attributable to the
decision-makers’ imposition of racial stereotypes or prejudices onto the imaginary study
subjects, which is exactly the effect that one wishes to isolate and quantify.
The Analytic Epidemiologic Model Applied to Disparities Arising from
Discrimination
In the experimental designs described above, the causal effect of interest is readily defined:
(eq. 4)
and the “setting” action is literal, because the case vignettes or job applications are physically
manipulated. With this model in mind, however, it is easy to extend the same logic to
observational studies in which no actual manipulation is achieved, but for which statistical
manipulation of the observed data is relied upon as a method for estimating what would happen
in an experimental scenario. If there are covariates Z that are associated with (but not affected
by) race and which are independently predictive of the outcome, these must be measured and
adjusted for in order to have confidence that the association measure in the study has a causal
interpretation. Specifically, this causal interpretation is the outcome distribution contrast that
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would be observed under a randomization of race to the case presentations, rather than
contrasting individuals based on their observed races.
For example, Todd and colleagues (2000) sought to determine the causal effect of patient race
on receipt of analgesics for extremity fractures in hospital emergency rooms. The authors
reviewed records from an urban emergency department in Atlanta, selecting for study all black
and white patients presenting with new, isolated long-bone fractures over a multi-year study
period. They collected all available medical and demographic information on these patients
along with their recorded level of analgesic administration, and used regression modeling to
adjust simultaneously for these multiple covariates that are potentially associated with race and
are predictive of treatment. For example, if black patients were more likely to be female, and
if females generally receive more analgesia, then sex would be a potential confounder of the
causal effect of interest. In this case, the authors found that after adjustment for all relevant
measured covariates, white patients were significantly more likely than black patients to
receive analgesics, despite similar records of pain complaints in the medical record. The risk
of receiving no analgesic at all was 66% greater for black patients than for white patients, an
effect that could not be explained by any confounding factor known to the investigators.
A less secure basis for causal inference in the observational study of discrimination, in contrast
to the experimental designs described above, arises because it is always possible that there is
some variable which is known to the decision-maker but not to the analyst, and which creates
a spurious association between race and outcome. For example, if black patients in the Todd
et al. study were more likely to have some legitimate counter-indication for analgesia that was
not recorded in the medical record, then it would appear to the analyst that emergency room
physicians were acting irrationally, when in fact their actions were justifiably motivated by
this hidden variable. This is the “fundamental problem of causal inference” that plagues all
observational research (Holland 1986), and the only general solution is to have sufficient
subject matter knowledge and sufficiently good data that one can have confidence that no
confounder of any importance remains unmeasured.
Heckman (1998) notes that even if all relevant covariates are measured, other modeling
improprieties, such as incorrect specification of the model form, can lead to bias in causal
estimation. Furthermore, if the decision is based in part on an unmeasured characteristic, and
if it is obtained by exceeding some critical threshold value, then changes in the distribution of
the unmeasured characteristic can also lead to observed inequality in the outcome even in the
absence of discrimination. This argument was in fact made recently by former Harvard
University President Lawrence Summers in his famously controversial speech about gender
inequality in science and engineering (Fogg 2005). For example, consider a hypothetical study
of gender discrimination in tenure decisions for women scientists at Harvard. Suppose that
some unmeasured aspect of mathematical ability has the same mean value in men and in
women, but a larger variance in men. If the tenure decision rests on some absolute threshold
of ability, then the longer right-tail of the distribution of this unmeasured trait in men will give
men a higher probability of exceeding this value, even when there is no discrimination.
The Analytic Epidemiologic Model Applied to Disparities Arising from Innate
Factors
Many investigators wish to evaluate hypotheses of racial disparity that arise from intrinsic
factors, including genetic differences (Fuller 2003) as well as differences in innate abilities
such as intelligence (Rowe DC 2005) or athletic prowess (Marks 2000). The dilemma that
arises is that application of the usual epidemiologic analysis rests, as it did in the previous
examples, on the direct analogy of the RCT. What we hope to achieve in an analysis of
observational data is the effect estimate that we would have been able to observe in the
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(hypothetical) RCT that we did not conduct. But the obvious problem is that this (hypothetical)
RCT is no longer so readily definable for intrinsic factors (Kaufman and Cooper 1999). The
problem is definitional because the no-confounding criterion in equation 2 above is expressed
in terms of the physical randomization of the study subjects, even if this manipulation is
hypothetical. For intrinsic factors, however, the model loses any semblance of interpretability.
This limitation of observational epidemiology has been noted previously (Holland 1986,
Holland 2001, Kaufman and Cooper 1999, Zuberi 2001), but even if one grants such a
definition, there is still the practical problem of adjusting for a potentially impossible number
of covariates. What finite set of measurable quantities can we adjust for in equation 3 to make
the treated and untreated groups (e.g. blacks and whites) each serve as valid substitute
populations for the other’s unobserved (counterfactual) experiences? (Maldonado and
Greenland 2002). Given the pervasive social distinction made between racial/ethnic groups in
racially stratified societies, it seems implausible to suggest that within some definable cross-
classifications of covariates, blacks and white might be considered to be exchangeable in all
respects except for the exposure (Kaufman et al. 1997).
If the basis for causal inference is subverted for non-manipulable (i.e., intrinsic) factors, then
how can we speak colloquially about health disparities arising from differential distributions
of biologic traits? For example, the age-adjusted 2001 incidence of melanoma in black men in
the US was 1.1 per 100,000, whereas for white men the incidence was 21.5 per 100,000, or
20-fold higher (U.S. Cancer Statistics Working Group 2004). Most people would be
comfortable attributing this disparity almost entirely to differences in average skin color
between these populations, even though this is a trait that is immutable, and for which no
randomized intervention is readily conceivable. Furthermore, we might even speak of a
counterfactual in which we imagine what would be the incidence in populations of African
origin if they were to have light skin, all other factors being equal, and most people would take
a number close to 21.5/100,000 as a reasonable estimate for this counterfactual. Or to take a
somewhat less obvious example, consider the ΔF508 mutation in the CFTR gene, a trait that
in homozygotes leads to an inability to transport salt in cells of the lungs called cystic fibrosis
(Rowe SM et al. 2005). US whites have a population prevalence of this mutation of about
1/2800 individuals, whereas for US blacks the mutation occurs in only about 1/35,000
individuals (Phillips et al. 1995). This variant appears to be sufficient (although not necessary)
for the development of the cystic fibrosis phenotype, and therefore it seems entirely reasonable
to attribute much of the observed racial disparity to differential distribution of this trait at the
population level.
What the skin cancer and cystic fibrosis examples demonstrate is that we can make inductive
arguments about intrinsic traits as causes of disparities so long as we can assume plausibly that
environmental factors are distributed more or less equivalently between the two groups (e.g.
ultra-violent radiation and skin cancer in the US) or that environmental factors are essentially
irrelevant (e.g. ΔF508 mutation and cystic fibrosis). In this situation, no covariate adjustment
(except perhaps age) is necessary, and the causal inference model represented by equation 3
can be expressed simply as:
(eq. 5)
This is because subject-matter knowledge assures that there are no factors that are both strongly
correlated with race and highly independently predictive of the outcome, and therefore no
“setting” (i.e., physical manipulation) of the exposure is necessary. If we were to consider
cystic fibrosis mortality as opposed to incidence, however, then this prima facie no-
confounding assumption would no longer be tenable, because socioeconomic and other factors
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that are associated with race can clearly contribute to disease severity and medical care, which
in turn affect mortality (Britton 1989, O’Connor et al. 2002).
For racial disparities in common multi-factorial disorders such as cardiovascular disease and
common cancers, the inductive inferential process exemplified by the cystic fibrosis incidence
example does not readily apply. If there is any single sufficient cause for diseases such a
diabetes or hypertension, it remains unknown, and most researchers believe that a large number
of genetic and environmental factors contribute interactively to risk, each with a relatively
small effect. Differential prevalence of some candidate gene would therefore provide little
information about differential prevalence of disease phenotype, since multiple pathways can
lead to the same observed disease endpoint. Moreover, we know that contrasting social and
economic environments lead to wide variations in phenotype even for groups with common
ancestry, such as the comparison of diabetes and hypertension risk across the diverse social
environments of the West African Diaspora (Cooper et al. 1997). When aspects of the physical
or social environment affect disease risk, and when these are correlated with race, then the
effect of race will be confounded, and this confounding cannot be eliminated for both
definitional and practical reasons. The definitional reason is that the criteria for no-confounding
(equation 2) involves a model of physical manipulation of the exposure that has no
interpretability when race is the exposure. The practical reason is that in a racially stratified
society, in which race is correlated with virtually all cultural traits, social interactions and
economic options, the dimensionality of covariate vector Z in equation 3 is impossibly large.
That is, one could never hope to measure sufficiently many characteristics of study subjects to
make the two groups exchangeable (i.e., valid substitute populations for the others’ average
counterfactual outcome experiences).
The conclusion regarding the epidemiologic approach to observational data on racial health
disparities seems unambiguous. When the investigator’s causal hypothesis involves unjustified
discrimination on the part of a decision-maker, then the statistical approach to causal inference
is generally defensible. The exposure effect can be theoretically randomized, which provides
a meaningful standard of what it would mean for the effect to be unconfounded. Furthermore,
when the data are observed rather than experimental, so that adjustment for covariates is
necessary, the universe of potentially confounding variables is often tractable. This is because
the causal process involves the deliberations of a decision-maker, and so the factors that
impinge upon this process can themselves be studied and enumerated. On the other hand, when
the investigator’s causal hypothesis involves an innate characteristic of the study subject, such
as genetics, physiology or psychology, then the statistical approach to causal inference on the
basis of multivariate adjustment is difficult to justify. There is no meaning to the randomization
model in equation 1, and therefore the no-confounding criterion in equation 2 remains
undefined. Furthermore, since there is no hope in the foreseeable future of knowing all of the
social and environmental mechanisms that affect risk of chronic diseases such as hypertension
and diabetes, and since racism creates imbalances in an essentially infinite set of social and
material factors, no adjustment is plausibly adequate. In common practice, adjustment sets are
generally so limited that the assertion of causal inference in this context cannot be considered
credible.
An Example of the Analytic Epidemiologic Model Applied to Innate Factors
In 2001, the New England Journal of Medicine published an article by Canadian cardiologist
Derek Exner, who had collaborated with Jay Cohn of the University of Minnesota to re-analyze
the combined arms of the “Studies of Left Ventricular Dysfunction” (SOLVD) trials (Exner et
al. 2001). This secondary analysis compared the efficacy of the angiotensin converting enzyme
(ACE) inhibitor enalapril with placebo in black and white heart failure patients. Exner et al.
concluded that current therapeutic recommendations apply to white patients but not necessarily
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to black patients, and therefore that future therapeutic recommendations should be tailored
according to racial background.
This article has proven quite influential, having been cited nearly 200 times in the peer-
reviewed literature as of the end of 2006, as documented by Journal Citation Reports (JCR),
a database published by the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI). Specifically, the article
has been cited heavily by proponents of race-specific therapies, as evidence of differential
response due to innate differences in physiology of disease between blacks and whites (e.g.,
Cohn 2002, Cohn 2003). Moreover, this article has been cited in treatment guidelines as
justification for discouraging use of ACE inhibitors in black patients (e.g., Khan et al. 2004).
It was also cited by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to justify the new policy that
clinical trial data must be reported by participants’ race (Haga and Venter 2003).
Given this substantial impact, it is reasonable to question whether the logic of the analytic
exercise conducted in the Exner et al. article is valid in relation to the critique discussed above.
The authors stress the randomized design of the SOLVD trials, as though this would confer to
them some advantage in obtaining the desired inference. But this appeal to randomization is
either misguided or disingenuous, since the focus of the analyses in this article is not on the
average treatment effect of enalapril (i.e., the focus is not on the factor that was randomized),
but rather on the effect measure modification of this average treatment effect by another
variable, race, which was not randomly assigned. Furthermore, there is much prior information
available which suggests that environmental determinants of disease are not well balanced
between the racial groups.
The authors began their report by noting that a previously published analysis of the same
SOLVD data showed a smaller estimated treatment effect in black than in white patients for
two outcomes (death from any cause or hospitalization for heart failure), but that this
differential treatment effect did not attain statistical significance after adjustment for measured
covariates (p = 0.08). (Dries et al 1999) The authors therefore set out to match each of the black
subjects with up to four white subjects on several measured factors: enrollment in either the
prevention or the treatment trial, ejection fraction, assigned therapy (enalapril or placebo), sex,
and age in three broad groupings. The authors claimed that this matching strategy would
increase their statistical power for the comparison of treatment effects by race, but this assertion
is in fact questionable because race was not randomized (Greenland and Morgenstern 1990).
In cohort studies, matching is primarily indicated in order to reduce costs in the collection of
data. Once the data are already collected, however, one can’t generally do better by throwing
away a large proportion of these data, as the SOLVD analysts did in this paper. This matching
strategy could be justified if the authors suspected effect measure heterogeneity, because in
this case the additional white subjects would be “off the support” for the causal comparison of
interest. (Manski 1993) In this case, however, the results would be generalizable only to the
range of values represented by the matching regime (e.g., ejection fractions at which both black
and white subjects were observed). The authors made no such restriction in their interpretation,
however.
A total of 6797 participants met the inclusion criteria for the study, 4228 from the prevention
trial and 2569 from the treatment trial. Of these, 800 categorized themselves as black. Another
5719 participants categorized themselves as white and thus were eligible to be matched with
one of the black participants. Of the 5719 white participants, 1196 (21%) were matched with
the black patients; the remaining 79% of white patients were discarded. For 579 (72%) of the
black participants there was only a single white match, and for 14 black participants (2%), no
suitable white match was found.
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Patients were randomly assigned to receive up to 20 mg of enalapril or placebo daily, a dosage
that could be modified by individual physicians who naturally were not blinded to the patient’s
race. The analysts collected a number of covariates, including medical care factors such as
other drug therapy prescriptions, and social factors such as the presence of financial distress
during the 12 months before enrollment and the highest level of education attained. The primary
outcome measures were deaths from any cause and hospitalization for heart failure.
Compared to matched white patients, black patients were in general younger, had higher mean
blood pressure, more exposure to recent financial distress, and lower average attained
educational level. They were also much less likely to be using aspirin, beta-blockers, or anti-
arrhythmics. In light of substantial differences in other dimensions of health and well-being
that exist in the wider society, there is no doubt that many other unmeasured variables also
differed substantially between the two groups. The matching procedure used by the authors
reduced, but did not eliminate, differences in means for observed variables. For example, the
relative probability of taking aspirin comparing white to black patients was reduced from 1.88
overall to 1.73 in the matched participants. It is therefore certain that substantial differences
remained between the matched participants in a host of other unmeasured variables, not to
mention residual confounding due to categorization of the measured variables (Kaufman et al
1997). For example, 37% of black participants and 24% of matched white participants reported
experiencing financial distress before entry into the study, but there is no basis to believe that
blacks and white experienced similar levels of deprivation, stress or hardship within the broadly
defined category of financial distress.
An important observation is that the absolute risk of the outcomes was higher for black than
for matched white participants. That is, even after matching on ejection fraction and other
factors, the black group was sicker on average than the white group. For example, 256 (33%)
of the matched black participants died, compared to 311 (26%) of the matched white
participants (relative risk = 1.25, 95% CI 1.09, 1.44). The discrepancy in baseline risk was
even more extreme in the case of the hospitalization, which affected 238 matched black
participants (30%) and 226 (19%) matched white participants (relative risk = 1.60, 95% CI
1.37, 1.88). Nonetheless, the authors ignored this discrepancy in baseline risk and focused on
the observation that there was an adjusted 49% reduction (95% CI: 30%, 63%) in the risk of
heart failure hospitalization for the treated group of matched white patients, whereas among
the black patients the adjusted risk reduction was only 14%, and not significantly greater than
0 at the p < 0.05 criterion.
It is well appreciated in the theoretical epidemiologic literature that groups with higher baseline
risk will in general have more modest response to treatment when ratio measures of effect are
employed, as they were in this analysis (Maldonado & Greenland 2002). This is because the
counterfactual ratio that defines that causal effect includes in both the numerator and the
denominator the proportion of the population that would experience the outcome under either
treatment assignment. In this application, for instance, there is some proportion of the
participants p1 that will be hospitalized for heart failure regardless of whether they receive
enalapril or placebo, there is a proportion of the participants p2 that will be hospitalized for
heart failure only if they receive placebo, and there is a remaining proportion of the participants
p3 that will not be hospitalized for heart failure regardless of which treatment they receive. A
treatment effect is the contrast between the outcome proportion if the entire study cohort were
treated with placebo and the outcome proportion if the entire study cohort were treated with
enalapril. This contrast may be constructed as the difference measure [(p1 + p2) − (p1)] = p2,
which reflects the fact that those participants susceptible to a treatment effect are those in the
p2 group only. A ratio measure of effect, such as that used by these authors, however, takes
the contrast as [(p1 + p2)/p1], so that those doomed to be hospitalized under either treatment
are no longer cancelled out of the treatment effect measure. For the ratio contrast, an increase
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in the cohort proportion p1 necessarily forces the measure closer to the null, even if the
susceptible population in the p2 group is held constant.
Returning to the Exner et al. analysis, it is clear that a population group with higher baseline
risk because they are sicker can be characterized as having a larger proportion p1. Knowing
that the sicker black study population has higher baseline risk of hospitalization than for whites,
therefore, it would be possible to predict a priori that the ratio measure of treatment effect for
this group will be constrained to be closer to the null. (White and Elbourne 2005) Membership
in the p1 sub-population simply represents hospitalization through some causal mechanism
that is not affected by enalapril. For example, over half of all heart failure hospitalizations
result from excessive sodium retention that precipitates volume overload. (Bennett et al.
1998) Patients with good educational and social support resources may successfully avoid
hospitalization by regular self-weighing and by then adjusting diuretic dosages in response to
fluctuations (Smith et al. 1997). If the social support and patient-physician communication
factors that facilitate this successful self-management are unmeasured, as they are in the
SOLVD data, then they manifest as a reduced treatment effect simply by inflating the
proportion p1 in the cohort sub-population.
Exner et al. do remark in their discussion that “[i]t is also possible that the findings may have
resulted from differences between the groups in compliance, diet, medical follow-up, or access
to care.” (p. 1356) Nonetheless, they then go on to ignore these caveats and conclude that “the
overall population of black patients with heart failure may be underserved by current
therapeutic recommendations….[I]t seems appropriate to consider current therapeutic
recommendations as applying to white patients but not necessarily to black patients.” The report
ends with the suggestion that “therapeutic recommendations may need to be tailored according
to racial background.” (p. 1357)
A Critique of the Exner et al Article as an Example of the Analytic
Epidemiologic Model Applied to Innate Factors
The Exner et al. article highlights the inherent problems of attempting statistical inferences
about innate factors in observational data. The analysis corresponds to no randomized trial that
could be described, even hypothetically, because the causal inference desired is the contrast
between a treatment effect for blacks and a treatment effect for whites under the premise that
groups are balanced on all important causes of the outcome. This premise motivated the crude
matching strategy, but the small number of factors matched and the large number of strong
unmeasured causes makes this strategy dubious at best. The authors list a few of the important
unmeasured variables that presumably remained unbalanced between the two groups, but the
stated conclusions appear untempered by this concern, and the article is widely cited as having
demonstrated a universally reduced capacity for therapeutic response among blacks as if the
assumption were satisfied. Conditioning on measured variables in the analysis, in addition to
matching, is a further attempt to create exchangeability between the race groups. For example,
the authors adjusted for the binary variable representing financial hardship, but the adjustment
would successfully remove the confounding bias due to this variable only if blacks and whites
who reported having experienced financial hardship were equivalent with respect to economic
and social factors that might relate to risk of hospitalization. Given the clear violation of this
assumption demonstrated in extant demographic data, the equality represented in expression
3 above can not be considered credible, even as an approximation.
The discussion above noted that in practice we often allow inductive arguments about intrinsic
traits as causes of disparities as long as we can assume plausibly that environmental factors
are distributed more or less equivalently between the two groups. In the Exner et al. example,
however, this is not the case, since psycho-social and economic factors are known to be
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unbalanced and highly relevant for a sociological outcome such as hospitalization. The larger
baseline difference for this outcome variable makes it even clearer that unmeasured factors
that differ between blacks and whites in general are important in determining the attained value.
Nonetheless, even though there were two primary outcomes defined, and hospitalization was
the weaker of the two (in the sense that baseline risk was substantially higher for blacks and
assignment was made without the decision-maker being blinded to patient race), the null
finding for mortality is largely ignored when the paper is cited as evidence of differential
treatment efficacy. Furthermore, the null finding for the harder endpoint of mortality has been
replicated elsewhere (Shekelle et al 2003), and re-analysis of the SOLVD data has shown that
hospitalization is unique among possible end-points in demonstrating a treatment effect
differential (Dries et al 2002).
In summary, the analytic strategy pursued in the Exner et al paper provides very little insight
into the nature of the observed disparites. The authors’ etiologic hypothesis is clearly stated as
a physiologic difference between blacks and whites, and yet the analytic epidemiologic model
applied to innate factors is dubious for the reasons described above. In this specific application,
however, the situation is made even more tenuous by the selection of an outcome for which
risk in the unexposed is the most discrepant of all possible outcomes, and for which assignment
is made subjectively and without being blinded to patient race. These problems are
compounded by an unjustified matching strategy that tosses out about 70% of the available
data. The result is a finding that has little inferential value for either supporting or refuting the
physiologic hypothesis of interest. Moreover, the observational analysis is designed to mimic
a randomized trial that cannot be defined in practical terms. Even allowing that the motivating
hypothetical trial remains indefinable, the alternate hypothesis that unmeasured determinants
of the outcome are imbalanced between the groups is so likely, and so plausibly consequential,
that there is little credibility associated with the assertion that the results of this analysis
approximate what would be obtained in the imaginary trial.
The weak basis for inference in the Exner et al. paper must be contrasted not only with its
appearance as the lead article in the most prestigious American medical journal, but also with
its considerable influence on the field. It is over-interpreted not just as evidence that “black
patients with chronic heart failure … derive less benefit from angiotensin-converting enzyme
inhibitors, on average, then do whites” (Satel and Klick 2005), but also to support the general
notion that “… there is now growing evidence for genetic factors being responsible for
individual response to therapy.” (Hovind et al 2004). Indeed, Bond et al (2004) cite the article
to support the assertion “[R]acial differences in responses to angiotensin converting enzyme
inhibitors are thought to result from both genetic and environmental factors.” Recall that the
Exner et al article in fact involved no analysis of genetic variants whatsoever, and yet this rather
surprising extrapolation is characteristic of many of the citing articles. For example, in an article
on racial variation in the prevalence of atrial fibrillation among heart failure patients, Ruo et
al. (2004) cite Exner et al. to support the statement “Another possible explanation for the lower
prevalence of atrial fibrillation in African Americans than in Caucasians with heart failure may
be intrinsic racial differences in atrial membrane stability, atrial conduction pathways, or
genetic polymorphisms leading to different susceptibility to the development of atrial
fibrillation. For example, polymorphisms have been found to be associated with racial
differences in … response to treatment for heart failure.” Moreover, the Exner et al. article has
also been interpreted as extending this logic to other completely unrelated conditions. Hughes
and colleagues (2002), for example, review genetic influences on rheumatoid arthritis in blacks,
noting that racial variation in therapeutic response for this condition has never been observed.
Nonetheless, they cite the Exner et al. analysis as evidence that such racial variation in treatment
response might reasonably be expected.
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The application of statistical reasoning in epidemiology has a clear foundation, rooted in the
notion of randomization that underlies all models, tests and quantitative inferences (Greenland
1990). Observational epidemiology makes use of this paradigm by analogy, arguing that we
may at times be able to mimic the process of physical randomization that occurs in trials through
statistical adjustment. That is, conditional on some measured factors, we can assert that no
important unmeasured determinants of the outcome remain substantially unbalanced between
treatment groups. This analogy has often proven quite useful, and has led to insights of
enormous public health importance over the previous 50 years, such as the discovery of the
causal association between cigarettes smoking and lung cancer. There are settings in which
this analogy does not hold, however, and these settings include the attempt to discover innate
physiological differences between racial/ethnic groups. The discussion above explains why
analytic epidemiology can be used sensibly and successfully to identify discrimination in
treatment as a cause of racial disparities in health, but not for the identification of innate
predispositions as a cause of racial disparities in health. The article by Exner and colleagues
is an example of how such an analysis can be largely unhelpful for evaluating the hypothesis
of interest, and in fact even potentially harmful. Despite its questionable inferential validity,
however, this article has proven quite influential, and has been cited to support a large number
of claims about racial predisposition to disease, many of which have very little to do with the
actual content of the article. This apparent eagerness to embrace the message of racial
essentialism therefore seems to represent a very strong prior belief on the part of many
researchers. Until this strong predilection for racial essentialism in biological thinking abates,
there would seem to be little hope that a more sensible and honest approach to statistical
inference in observational data will take hold more widely.
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